morte zero
ultramorte, megamorte, multimorte, nanomorte, nove mihões de maneiras de morrer (nine million ways to die); qual a morte mais mortal? mas não seria essa pergunta justamente descabida? pois não era a morte que estava do lado da diferença e se bifurcou, dando origem à vida, esta sim, com suas inúmeras variações de grau?
lendo land (the thirst for anihilation: georges bataille and virulent nihilism, routledge, 1992), capítulo 9, “abortando a raça humana”, são figurados outros tantos bergsonismos: matéria e espírito, natureza e cultura, caos e ordem, zero e plenitude, forças ativas e reativas, inorgânico e orgânico, guerra e indústria.
To set up the question of difference as a conflict between the one and the many is a massive strategic blunder – the Occident lost its way at this point – the real issue is not one or many, but many and zero. [147]
se esses dualismos remetem a monismos, esses monismos devem remeter ao grande e imenso zero (o próprio zero também), à diferença diferenciante.
{de um modo bastante ingênuo eu esperava que land fosse um deleuzeano que descontaminasse o deleuzianismo de seu bergsonismo}
postado em 16 de junho de 2014, categoria excertos, livros : aborto, bergsonismo, diferença, gilles deleuze, henri bergson, morte, nick land, the thirst for anihilation, zero
jp caron remete a ray brassier
” “They provide a sobering contrast with the flaccid inanity of contemporary Bergsonian vitalism.” ” In many ways, you can align the Deleuzian critique of representation with the Bergsonian critique of representation. Much of what Deleuze says is problematic about the categories of representation, about representation as the mediating framework that segments and parcels out the world, the flux of duration, into discretely individuated objects… the claim is that you have a sub-representational layer of experience which it is possible to access through intuition. The Bergsonian critique of metaphysics and the destitution of representation intuits the real differences in being, you can intuit the real nature of matter, time; duration in the Bergsonian register.
There’s a problem here for Landianism, because he can’t do this. He’s supplanted representation, but he wants to supplant this kind of Bergsonian vitalist phenomenology for an unconscious thanatropism. The point is: how do you access the machinic unconscious? It’s not simply given. Land insists time and time again, nothing is ever given, everything is produced. The problem is that Land’s materialist liquidation of representation, because it doesn’t want to reaffirm, allegedly, the primacy of sub-representational experience, which Bergson and phenomenology do in various ways… he has to explain what it is he’s talking about. He’s doing a kind of materialist metaphysics, and there’s an issue about what kind of traction this extraordinarily sophisticated conceptual apparatus can gain upon the process of primary production, the real as intensive difference, matter in itself, whatever you want to call it.” http://moskvax.wordpress.com/…/accelerationism-ray…/